The US «kicks back» most of its aid to Afghanistan

Despite statements made by the US President D. Trump about the need for early withdrawal of the US military from Afghanistan, there is a clear interest of the Pentagon, the CIA and the industrial complex — including in a material sense — in maintaining a military presence in this country. What it involves is the misuse of financial aid flows to Afghanistan by the Americans for mercenary purposes.

For almost two decades of the Afghan Campaign and the presence of the NATO and American contingents, Washington formally allocated large-scale funds not only for promoting security, but also for the civilian reconstruction and development of this country. Since 2001, approximately USD 130 billion has been granted to Afghanistan. However, by no means all of the money arrived to the country in need. A significant part of the “aid” remained in the US in the form of kickbacks, as evidenced, inter alia, by the numerous reports of the US Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction John Sopko. As a result, corruption schemes for “cutting up” the funds allocated to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan by the Americans themselves only exacerbated the already difficult economic situation in the country trying to recover from military-political upheavals.

The question arises as to how authorities involved in contracts manage to “hold” a large share of tranches. The case is that for the distribution of financial assistance to Afghanistan, there is a multi-level system of contracts, with the participation of American contractors and local subcontractors. First of all, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) is used to “cut up” aid to Afghanistan, through which corrupt officials pocket about 50% of financial flows, and, for example, in the case of the program for the advancement of women in Badakhshan and Khost provinces, the share of misappropriated funds reached 90–95%.

As a standard scheme, the USAID transfers the funds for a project to an Afghan agency, which provides justification to the local Ministry of Finance on its knowingly exaggerated cost. After cashing out the contract, half of this amount is given to USAID-related individuals. It is likely that the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund grants are used in the same way, but to a lesser extent due to the greater number of witnesses in international organizations.

The scale of American financial aid, the appropriateness of which is ambiguously assessed within the US, also raises questions. Above-mentioned J. Sopko noted in a report to the US Congress in February 2020 that the amount of aid allocated significantly exceeds the capabilities of the Afghan economy. According to the Special Inspector General, the amount of funds should be from 15 to 45% of the country’s GDP, while in 2007 and 2010 the US subsidies to Afghanistan amounted to over 100% of the IRA’s GDP. It appears obvious that such expenses are not effective, but create opportunities for misappropriation. Moreover, the attempts of American politicians to cut spending in Afghanistan seem to be met with resistance from the military, which is interested in maintaining a substantial source of income, and the contractors involved in this area.

On 23 March 2020, the US Secretary of State M. Pompeo announced USD 1 billion reduction in aid to Kabul due to inability of the two presidential contenders, A. Ghani and A. Abdullah, to agree on power-sharing following very dubious election results. Nevertheless, there is no evidence of Washington fulfilling the promise of the Head of the Department of State. Recently, the US Democratic Senators even requested the US Secretary of Defense M. Esper to report on cost reductions, but the report was never submitted. It appears that the Pentagon leaves this question open, and moreover, the military clearly does not want to cut the aid by reducing its items.

The US defence industry has a particular interest in funds allocated to Afghanistan. Purchases and deliveries of goods to the contingents of the United States and NATO, as well as to the Afghan security forces, are often carried out without taking into account economic feasibility and at inflated prices beneficial to American manufacturers. So, instead of building a plant in Afghanistan that would produce cartridges for the M-4 and M-16 rifles at 12 cents apiece, Washington continues to purchase them for the needs of the Afghan security forces from its suppliers at a price of 57 cents apiece. In addition, the US military refused to purchase Russian kerosene at 94 cents per litre, purchasing it in Greece at 1.4 US dollars per litre. To avoid control, the United States provides financial assistance to the Afghan security forces through its own fund, rather than through international structures.

American civilian project contractors use the same principle to inflate the real value of goods and services, including those supplied through the USAID. For example, recently, not without their contribution, the IRA Ministry of Health sold about 10 thousand coronavirus tests at a price of $ 48 apiece, whereas their real value does not exceed $ 5.

The plumiest contracts, such as the supply of oil products, the provision of arms, military equipment and uniforms to the Afghan army and NATO contingent, are lobbied by American congressmen, whose wives receive cushy positions on the boards of directors of the respective companies. However, the real recipients of kickbacks do not want to engage in “dirty” work. Numerous expats are the ‘problem solvers’ in this world; the requirement of hiring them for astronomical salaries for Afghanistan (about USD 30–40 thousand per month) is a condition of most contracts, behind which is the United States.

It is not surprising that despite its astronomical size, American aid to Afghanistan, which in terms of the volume has long exceeded the funds once allocated according to the Marshall Plan for the restoration of post-war Europe, only allows the American military and contractors involved in its distribution to enrich themselves, while the result of such assistance is not felt in Afghanistan, and its effectiveness as a whole tends to zero.

Recently, the media reported that the top leaders of the IRA had attempted to corner the flow of foreign financial assistance. In April 2020, President A. Ghani, bypassing parliament, announced he would reform the Ministry of Finance and place several of its departments responsible for budget, state duties and customs charges under the direct supervision of the presidential administration. However, the State Department criticized the decision of A. Ghani as “corrupt.” It is noteworthy that immediately after such comments, the Afghan president withdrew his initiative. Kabul’s political dependence on Washington plays into the hands of the US corruption schemes. The Americans clearly do not want to lose control of external financial injections into the IRA and do not allow even their wards to distribute them.